One of my oral examination fields is “the history of childhood and youth.” It is very fortunate that there are a couple of professors working in this field in my university. I have just started my readings this month (finally!) but I have already encountered a number of “ah hah!” moments. I’d like to share some of them here.
There has been something called “a new paradigm” in studies of childhood especially in sociology since the early 1990s. It is supposed to deny and overcome the previously prevalent developmental (psychological) approach and structural-functionalist approach. James and Prout summarize the new paradigm in Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood as:
1. Childhood is understood as a social construction
2. Childhood is a variable of social analysis. It can never be separated from other variables such as class, gender, or ethnicity
3. Childhood and children’s social relationships and cultures are worthy of study in their own right.
4. Children are active in the construction and determination of their own social lives
5. Ethnography is a useful methodology
To this Patrick Ryan gives a sharp comment that the focus on children’s agency (and their “authentic voices”) is a manifestation of modern romanticism of personhood (individualism), that modern childhood will continue showing the space between the natural phenomenon and the politics of representing it (a paradoxical position as an object of knowledge and a subject who knows), and that this paradox itself is not a new problem but an old one that was already there between Locke and Rousseau. (( Ryan, Patrick J. “How New is the ‘New’ Social Study of Childhood?: The Myth of a Paradigm Shift.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 38,4. 2008. 553-576 )) Ryan’s analytics are very impressive and give you a better grasp of how the field developed. But I can also see why this “new paradigm” was an important moment for sociologists — it is similar to when international relations theorists discovered constructivist theory for the first time. The emphasis on identities, ideologies, and ideas was not new at all, but rather was considered not rigorous enough in the “scientific-minded” paradigm. Coming back to the idea of historicity and intersubjectivity with full theoretical backing must have been exciting in sociology, too.
What is surprising for me is not really the new or old paradigm, but the question of “children’s historical agency.” In actuality, most of the writings on the history of childhood are about things surrounding children, including families, childbirth professionals, laws, poverty, demography, and schooling, for example. Interestingly, Mary Maynes suggests to avoid “agency” in historical inquiry altogether because of its inappropriateness in studying the lives of girls – and children in general. (( Maynes, Mary. “Age as a Category of Historical Analysis: History, Agency, and Narratives of Childhood,” Journal of The History of Childhood and Youth 1.1, 2008: 114-124. )) I first did not take her point seriously but I keep coming back to this problem — why do we need to identify someone’s historical agency? does this mean that those without historical agency deserve no attention of historians? Steven Mintz, the author of my favorite American history book Huck’s Raft also claims the importance of children’s historical agency. But at the same time, obviously, in most circumstances, external forces (economic, social hierarchy, war etc) are more compelling factors that shape children’s world. Not denying that children have some power as agents of history, I wonder, why it has to be stated repeatedly and why historians are obsessed with this question. My temporary answer to it is that it is because of a prescriptive notion that children should have power in deciding their own society and fate — reflecting global movements to “empower children” advocated by many civic groups and the UNESCO.
I’ve not read much of the theory on this point, but what’s the difference between “individuality” and “historical agency”? Does the latter imply, as you suggest, historical importance or is a more philosophical point? Just because someone is economically or politically powerless doesn’t mean they aren’t a legitimate focus of historical study, clearly: that point was settled long ago, it seems. Or is it a more functional question: children have historical agency because they grow up (usually) to be adults, who are presumed to have it.
That’s the thing. The definition of “historical agency” really depends on whom you ask — some have more elaborate philosophical answers than others. But these historians I was referring to usually do not clarify what they mean by that. I would say, “historical agency” is closer to “subjectivity” than “individuality.” Indeed, we did settle on the issue of the “economically and politically powerless,” but I think we are still ambivalent about those who do not have a lot of power in engaging in (e.g. creating or challenging or replacing) the major discourse or epistemes or paradigms or whatever you call it. Historians have to do history, not only theorizing, so I think it is a legitimate question to ask what is the justification of why we study what we study. And this question, however uncomfortable it is for historians, brings us really close to the often-criticized positivist answer of “because that’s what we can study.”
I think we are still ambivalent about those who do not have a lot of power in engaging in (e.g. creating or challenging or replacing) the major discourse or epistemes or paradigms
True, especially since resistance is so fundamental to both Marxist and Foucauldian ethics. I think the fact that those who are most powerless are often the most numerous, there’s a kind of auto-justification there for a social historian (which has its own ethic) who wants to get away from elitist conceptions of historical interest. The interesting thing, though, is that studying “normal people” often results in immensely complicating the conventional wisdom about what’s normal, about why conventions exist, and about how they were actually enacted, so that the history becomes a kind of historiography of resistance.